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Kiadó:
Brenner János Hittudományi Főiskola
Főszerkesztő:
Dr. Maróti Gábor
HU ISSN 3003 - 9819


2026/ 2. szám

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Maróti Gábor


A methodological framework for legal philosophy: Hermeneutic analysis, liturgical law, and the application of semiotics

 
Our normative roots, the beginning of our sacred legal order, are functionally ritual discipline, value preservation, liturgical discipline, the starting point of which is the mutual synthesis of the institution and the deposit of faith.
The sacred liturgy of the Church consists of acts, words and instruments, which liturgical science calls a system of instrumental elements. Canon law places this system within a normative framework with the general principles of law[1] (universality, externality, imperative character, sanctionedness),[2] the classical name of which is ius liturgicum (liturgical law). The codes of law of the codified regulation in force contain liturgical legal material, but this is not the primary source of the performance of sacred acts, but rather the liturgical books containing the textual sources and implementation rules for the celebration of the sacramental order.[3] The concept of rite denotes the sequence of acts that contains the sources of descriptions and provisions aimed at the empirical appearance of the given liturgical family.
The liturgical law is not the same as the codified protective norms found in the codified sources, but rather the textual provision of the specific liturgical form itself, which includes the gesticulations prescribed for the performance of the act,[4] the instruments used and the prayers recited; all of this in a way that is tied to a specific person – role. The most important liturgical books are: Missale Romanum, Liturgia horarum, Rituale Romanum, Caeremoniale Episcoporum, as well as the books containing the texts of the sacraments, sacraments and blessings.
Before I describe the circumstances and characteristics of the codex promulgated in 1917 and the regulations in force, as well as the liturgical law after the Second Vatican Council, I will briefly present the ancient textual history of liturgical provisions.
The common ancestor of all early disciplinary writings is the Didache, which is updated around specific issues justified by local problems.[5] This document deals with the election of bishops and the service of widows in Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopian Coptic versions. It mentions the institution of lectors.
The „Diatagai ton hagion apostolon” (Latin/ Constitutiones Apostolorum), a pseudoepigraph, a document of apostolic authority (referring to Clement), has the following themes: encouragement to infant baptism, questions of the validity of heretical baptism, and the prescription of a 40-day fast. This document deals with sub-priests, ostiarius, and singers. It provides a specific liturgical disciplinary framework regarding the orientation of the sanctuary, the construction of churches, and the placement of the two pastophoria (on the right and left). Book 6 of the document contains the funeral order, and Book 7 contains a detailed explanation of the rules of the earlier Didache. Here appears the great doxology recommended for the morning prayer. Book 8 ("Charisms") ordinations, episcopal ordination mass: this is the earliest surviving complete mass text.
The document entitled “The Testament of Our Lord Jesus Christ”, originally written in Greek but only surviving in Syriac, Coptic and Arabic translations, did not intend to act with apostolic, but directly Christian authority. It contains liturgical prescriptions. The legend is that before his ascension, Jesus gives his followers apocalyptic information about signs, church organization and moral issues.[6] The second book of this is interesting from a liturgical history and disciplinary point of view, as it provides an extremely detailed account of the details of the Eucharistic rite.[7] Lajos Dolhai (2001) refers to a 5th-century Monophysite Syrian author.
Two things can be established as a fact from these early examples: 1) the performance of liturgical acts was bound to authority, 2) there was a normative and knowable order. The forums of later liturgical legislation, the sacramentaries, the ordines romani series and the resolutions of the ecumenical councils are primarily liturgical history issues, so I will continue with the specific codified legal material.
DISCIPLINE
Liturgical discipline does not mean solutions to external frameworks and the limited ability to act between frameworks. This approach would assume an automatism incapable of unfolding,[8] which at most performs something, but in no way can autonomous and authentic communication be expected from it. The disciplinary structure is not “outside” in the same way that our body is not alien to our personality;[9] we limit our time and adapt to its operating principles, but we accept that we do not live with our body, but identify with it. This liturgical discipline does not protect the liturgical event from the interventions of the rite subject, but the integrity of the faith from changes that would violate the unity of the church and the liturgy, as well as the realization and creation of the liturgical event. The disciplinary character of liturgical law neither takes away nor adds to the liturgy: it ends the content of tradition in the normative framework structures of the authority that arises in the institution.
The ius liturgicum was included in the CIC 1917 primarily in Book III (De rebus): the sections between canons 731–1258 contained the complete legal regulation of the sacraments, sacramentals, holy times and holy places. This formed the starting point of modern liturgical law, which the liturgical reform of the Second Vatican Council (1963, Sacrosanctum Concilium) and the 1983 code have already placed on new foundations. The text of the CIC1983 has a more pronounced theological approach, specifically seeking and indicating the patterns of unity of the lex orandi – lex credendi, and retaining shorter and fewer detailed rules. The regulation of the liturgy is not found in quantitative but in methodological interpretation, in liturgical books and in the documentation of the Holy See. In this implementation system, the Code promulgated in 1983 can in no way be considered a ritual code, but rather the framework law of the ius liturgicum.
Short linguistic interpretative analysis, (SC Apostolic constitution 1963)
“Therefore nothing else happens in this sacred liturgy, except that the work of our redemption may be carried out…” (nothing else happens in this sacred liturgy, except that the work of our redemption may be carried out in practice). The syntactic meaning of the two passive constructions (agitur – happens, takes place; and exercetur: to exercise, to be carried out) is imperative,[10] that is: nothing else should happen in this sacred liturgy except what is necessary for the practical realization of the work of our redemption! More emphatically: “Nothing else should happen in this sacred liturgy except what is necessary for the practical realization of the work of our redemption!”
Disciplinary consequences:
The conceptual category of the sacred liturgy is not characterized by, but rather a condition for, the performance of a pure event free from exclusionary factors (the normative emphasis of the act included in the interpretation: – “do not happen”). [11]The work of our salvation (the founding reason and purpose of the Church) is in practice (act – necessary) closely related to the lawful realization of the sacred liturgy. “Do not let anything happen!” (exclusionary, emphatic, disciplinary method) So: everything that is contrary to this, or does not fully realize this, violates the existence and purpose of the Church.[12] This discipline is the basis of liturgical law. Everything else can be traced back to this basic principle.[13]
Later, the textual adaptations taken from the instructions for the implementation of the liturgical provisions and the introductory provisions of the liturgical books formed the basis of the canon which, as a rule for the fulfillment of the sanctifying task, emphasizes the institutional character of the performance of the liturgy: “Munus sanctificandi Ecclesia perculiari modo adimplet per sacram liturgiam” (Cf. CIC Can. 834. - §1.), i.e. – namely - the mission is carried out in a manner established in the legal order.[14] Later, the Code of Canon Law also specifies the hierarchical structure of authority.
From a disciplinary point of view, an interesting argument in favor of the authority structure is contained in point 12 of the instruction Redemptionis Sacramentum, which interprets the danger of breaking the liturgical act from tradition and the illegality of attempts at appropriation: RS 12: “the liturgy should never seem to be anyone’s private property” (neither to the celebrant nor to the community celebrating the mysteries). We find a similar exclusionary method among the canons that specify the sanctifying task of the Church (cf. CIC 838.k. §1): “moderatio … unice pendet” The direction depends exclusively, in a unique way, irreplaceably, and unchangeably on the “Ecclesiae auctoritate” (ecclesiae authority). The source does not use an institutional historical concept, denoting a current governmental structure, but an ecclesiological one. This theological emphasis connects the institutional act of the liturgical event as a legal category, i.e., a category framing regulation, to the essence that constitutes the existence of the Church. The logical conclusion of this connection is that liturgical law is not administration, but the conceptual search for the defining and decisive criteria of the possibility of contact with objective reality[15]: relationship building.
Now a deep linguistic analysis of a sentence of RS11 will be carried out
The sentence:
Mysterium Eucharistiae maius est quam ut quisquam sibi permittat proprio id arbitratu tractare.
Mysterium: noun, singular, neuter gender, nominative case (secret) / Eucharistiae: noun, feminine, singular possessive case (of something..) together: The mystery of the Eucharist; this is the subject of the sentence. / maius est: the adjective magnus (great) middle, neuter gender, singular, nominative case (agreed with mysterium) meaning: “greater” /est: verb to be (esse) 3rd person, singular, present tense (is) together: “greater than..” / quam (as) combined with „ut” which is a conjunction expressing a goal, result, intention: this is a construction that starts a comparative adverbial clause, / quisquam: a pronoun often used in a negative sentence (someone, anyone) in this case: the subject of the clause, / sibi: the participial form of the reflexive pronoun se (“to oneself”) when combined: „quisquam sibi permittat” (“someone allows oneself something”) / permittat: allows, permits. Structurally: subjunctive mood (due to the conjunction ut), 3rd person singular, (“so that someone allows oneself”) / proprio arbitratu: proprius (own) possessive adjective masculine/neuter singular ablative / arbitratu: (arbitratum noun – discretion, decision) masculine singular, ablative form (“at one’s own discretion/pleasure”) ablative modi: shows how to do something, / id: demonstrative pronoun, neuter, singular, objective (that) Here: refers back to the mystery of the Eucharist, (points to) what the subject wants to do at his own discretion, / tractare: nominative participle (to handle, deal with, deal with) Here: dependent on the verb permittat (“to allow to handle”).
Adapted:
The mystery of the Eucharist is greater than anyone allowing themselves to treat it as they see fit. From a disciplinary perspective, this analyzed proposition does not primarily argue for the possibility of sanction or the burden of invalidity.[16] It starts from the fact that the Eucharistic faith and its objective content must in themselves be a normative force that determines all those who submit themselves to the law[17] (“the community to which the law can be given”) and voluntarily engage in the sacrificial act.[18] The conscientious category of the voluntary search for value leads later to the liturgical legal aspect of creativity.
Further conclusions based on the definition of the proposition: (in the text of the document RS11, content summary) whoever acts contrary to this violates the unity of the Roman rite, the action does not correspond at all to the thirst for God of the man of the time, is not an authentic pastoral activity, does not serve the correct renewal of the liturgy, but: deprives the faithful of the heritage that is theirs. ("it is therefore necessary that ... the liturgy should not seem to be anyone's private property” /RS 12) I will illustrate my position on the natural relationship between the practice, science, and method of liturgical law and the Latin language with a short quote (the cited source is found in paragraph 3 of Pope Francis’s motu proprio Magnum principium, issued in 2017): “(…) the vernacular languages were often only able to gradually become liturgical languages that did not differ from liturgical Latin in terms of the elegance of their style and the precision of their concepts intended to nourish the faith; (…) The Latin Church was aware of the sacrifice awaiting it, that it would partially lose its own liturgical language, which it had used throughout the world for centuries, yet it gladly opened the door so that translations, as parts of the rites themselves, could become, together with the Latin language, the voice of the Church celebrating the divine mysteries.”
From a pastoral point of view, I naturally consider vernacular communication to be essential and practical, which is the basic condition of prarticipatio actuosa, but referring to the above quote, I consider it possible to state that the functionality of the liturgical law of the Latin rite clearly uses Latin as the primary linguistic medium in the methodology of text interpretation[19] and creativity. One of the characteristics of the liturgical legal approach of the period after 2000 has become the publication of materials aimed at establishing responsibility and the presence and avoidance of extremes or abuses. By way of comparison: Liturgiam autenthicam drew attention in detail to conceptual accuracy, textual fidelity, and literality as conditions for recognitio, while the instruction Redemptionis Sacramentum, a few years later, explicitly establishes misunderstandings and even abuses with a disciplinary purpose. The document is characterized by its effort to concretize correct practice.
In addition to the central intention to avoid abuses, one example of a legislative measure arguing for practicality, i.e. the feasibility and practical reality of liturgical discipline in particular churches, is the Magnum Principium motu proprio. With this document, Pope Francis modified the text of Canon 838 of the CIC, as a result of which the responsibility and autonomy of the local particular church in the preparation, revision and approval of translations of liturgical books is saturated with new necessary content. Representatives of certain schools understood decentralization in the decision, however, it can be understood with the logic of common sense that the liturgical reform process following the Second Vatican Council, half a century after the revision and basic translation of the liturgical books into the vernacular,[20] is no longer where it was in 1970! No phonetic or comprehensive syntactic decisions are expected from the particular church jurisdictions, but rather a linguistic and theological actualization of the meaning-enriching and clarifying semiological and colloquial interpretation set.[21] If the liturgical reform of the Second Vatican Council is treated and accepted not only as the fixing of a position, but as a convergent process of changing perspectives; similar liturgical legal changes are evaluated not as decentralization, but as development.
CREATIVITY
The category of the ius liturgicum and the discipline is the methodology of “how”. The essence of creativity is the “why” (not the search for another “how”). The secret has an unpossessable aspect that cannot be placed within conceptual frameworks. Creativity is by no means a polemical and deviant separation or a new path. The protective function of canon law for the integrity of the liturgy belongs to the disciplinary layer. The forum of creativity is the internal logic beyond the text, which can be matched to the operation of the action. The process and content of creativity: interpretation and the conclusions arising from it. Categories of interpretation:
autotextuality (the semiotic consequence is the same as the text and its content), this is a closed reading, a concept that strongly strives for authenticity, preserving values
ideotextuality (the semiotic consequence also validates social or psychological “behind-the-text” contents) in this reading the liturgy concept deals with ritual theories (e.g. the principle of participatio actuosa) the “behind-the-text” is real and functional
intertextuality (the semiotic consequence validates content outside the text but within the rubric) in this reading the liturgy concept deals with regulated but optional elements of creativity (e.g. folk piety, regional liturgical custom, or in certain cases “speech” outside the homily)
If liturgy is an act, text, signifying process, gesture, material and architecture, liturgical law is the normative framework defining the textualities of liturgy.[22] There are two basic types of creativity possibilities regarding the sign system: discursive (e.g. text) and representative (e.g. visuality). All signs serve the process of perception. The deterministic logic of emphasis of liturgical law is primarily directed towards discursiveness, but it also categorically adapts the mental and real appearance of representative perception. In the signifying processes of visual and verbal perception, the “window to supernatural reality” opens (this is an explanation of the “why” of liturgical law, which excludes arbitrariness).
Three examples: text – vestment – language/regulation
If the regulated appearance of the liturgy is directed towards a signifying process, the essence of the legal character protects the integrity of the sign application.
a) The signifying function of the text protects the content validity of the concept (e.g. in the case of a validity condition), while the metaphorical and associative interpretation of the words (from the recipient's point of view) is unverifiable and unregulated. (Every individual reading is a metaphor).
b) The semiotic function of the vestment: a stylized world, the experiential medium of the ritual event. Its essence is metamorphosis, the perception of the assumed role meaning. In the liturgical signifying process, liturgical law regulates the type of vestment with conceptual methods (e.g. "chasuble and not a cloak") but less, if at all, the concrete geometric structures of the form. In this process of signification, liturgical law, which protects the essence of the liturgy, does not standardize, but excludes improvisation. This would be contrary to all three semiotic categories of creativity.
c) The conceptual mediating function of language partly signifies, but in the central elements of the liturgy, in the realizations of the sacramental order, language is not only a signifying, but also a constitutive medium: the deepest functional framework of the conceptual implementation of the text. In the interpretation of the principle of participatio actuosa, the Latin language does not interpret, it is not a signifying medium for the faithful; therefore, the subject of regulation becomes the vernacular and translation, which are the autotextual and intertextual regulatory forums of creativity in a single act.
The appearance of the action and active participation bring the ritual subject into the “here and now” situation, therefore, autotextuality, in contrast to ideo- and intertextuality (in relation to the execution of the action), is most capable of uniting the meaning of the participatory action with the receptive subject. This is why the liturgical rules aimed at action must be interpreted as precisely as possible. Creativity does not exclude the elevation of the individual visual world into the action, but in the absence of authentic and faithful execution of specific actions, the liturgical event itself is damaged.
The extremes of creativity and following the norm can result in typical misunderstandings. The robotic execution structure, which is never spontaneous, surreally measured, almost psychedelically ordered, violates the signifying functions of rituality just as much as the system-skeptical boundlessness without a formal canon.
One of the irregular consequences (to be avoided or sanctioned) of the incorrect conception of creativity is self-referentiality. The ritual element factors (gesture, sound, color, form, person, role) are not autonomous abstractions, but elements of the structure of the signifying process, in harmony with each other and with the essence of the liturgy. If these become independent planes of meaning that are separated from the process (e.g. the movement is only vectorial, but its representation is not at all discursive), it becomes less of a liturgical act, but only self-reference: a mechanically implemented fixation. Normatypical textual factors in individual concrete cases provide less opportunity for this as a “disciplinary” regulation;[23] therefore, liturgical creativity as the application layer of liturgical law is in a sense a category beyond canon law, yet part of the sacred order.
Reception – inner freedom as a layer of creativity
The appearance of the liturgy is a unified semiotic system, in these 3 factors (unity, interpretation, order) creativity is given the opportunity. The implementation of the liturgy is a process through the application of signs. Every participant in the celebration is both a servant and a receiver. The “behind” of the signs becomes accessible through the interpretation of the symbols. The error of self-referentiality empties the gifts of the liturgy because in this implementation the sign is directed only at itself, while the conciliar principle of participatio actuosa requires active “and conscious” participation; therefore, personal and precise understanding (interpretation of symbols). In this sense, reception is on the one hand perceptual, insofar as the receptive ritual subject comes into contact with the perceived and empirically experienced instrumental elements; on the other hand, it is hermeneutical, insofar as all this (symbolic interpretation) signifying process prompts and assists the subject in thinking and understanding within the conceptual framework. From the point of view of creativity, one of the richest possibilities for this hermeneutic element interpretation is silentium sacrum.
Creativity and Variations
Actions in some cases contribute as illustrative tools to the perception and understanding of the essence. Within the framework of liturgical law, these emerging functions are not manipulative tools, but rather signs administered in the hermeneutic process, which purposefully influence[24] and serve perception.

[1] Heimerl, H. – Pree, H., Kirchenrecht, Allgemeine Normen und Ehenrecht, Wien – New York, 1983. 11.
[2] May, G. - Egler, A., Einführung in die kirchenrechtliche Methode, Regensburg, 1986. 29.
[3] Bydlinski, F., Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff, Wien – New York Springer Verlag, 1996. 212.
[4] Savigny, E., Argumentation in der Literaturwissenschaft, München, 1976. 179.
[5] Soeteman, J. T. A., Logic in Law, Dordrecht Kluwer, 1989. 29.
[6] May, G. - Egler, A., Einführung in die kirchenrechtliche Methode, Regensburg, 1986. 146.
[7] Heimerl, H. – Pree, H., Kirchenrecht, Allgemeine Normen und Ehenrecht, Wien – New York, 1983. 92.
[8] Schapp, J., Hauptprobleme der juristischen Methodenlehre, Tübingen, 1983. 101.
[9] Tebaldeschi, I., Rechtwissenschaftals Modellwissenschaft, Wien – New York, Springer, 1979. 87.
[10] Savigny, E., Argumentation in der Literaturwissenschaft, München, 1976. 191.
[11] Winkler, G., Theorie und Methode in der Rechtwissenschaft, Wien – New York Springer, 1989. Ziembinski, Z., Practical logic, Dordrecht – Boston, Reidel Publishing, 1976. 44.
[12] Heimerl, H. – Pree, H., Kirchenrecht, Allgemeine Normen und Ehenrecht, Wien – New York, 1983. 93.
[13] May, G. - Egler, A., Einführung in die kirchenrechtliche Methode, Regensburg, 1986. 78.
[14] Savigny, E., Argumentation in der Literaturwissenschaft, München, 1976. 203.
[15] Bydlinski, F., Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff, Wien – New York Springer Verlag, 1996. 77.
[16] Simmonds, N. E., The Decline of Juridical Reason, Doctrine and Theory in the Legal Order, Manchester University Press, 1984. 7.
[17] Sherman, B., Hermeneutics in Law, 51 Modern Law Review (1988) 487-499. 496.
[18] May, G. - Egler, A., Einführung in die kirchenrechtliche Methode, Regensburg, 1986. 37.
[19] Searle, J. R., The Philosophy of Language, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979. 210.
[20] May, G. - Egler, A., Einführung in die kirchenrechtliche Methode, Regensburg, 1986. 79.
[21] Savigny, E., Argumentation in der Literaturwissenschaft, München, 1976. 160.
[22] May, G. - Egler, A., Einführung in die kirchenrechtliche Methode, Regensburg, 1986. 36.
[23] Betti, E., Die Problematik der Auslegung in der Rechtwissenschaft, In: Bockelmann, P., - Kauffmann, A., - Klug, U., Festschrift für Karl Engisch, München, 1992. 76.
[24] Wróblewski, J., The Judicial Application of Law, Dordrecht Kluwer, 1992. 11.